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Abstract 
  This article has 3 goals: to describe the origins and development of environmental 
standing law, to present theoretical objections to the requirement that environmental plaintiffs 
                                                 
∗ This note was the recipient of the 2009 Irving Oberman Memorial Award for best essay in the 
field of environmental law. 
∗∗ J.D. Candidate 2010, Harvard Law School.  The author would like to thank Professor Richard 
Lazarus for his supervision, guidance and support. 
∗∗∗ This article will be published in the University of Missouri Environmental Law and Policy 
Review in Fall 2009. 
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 demonstrate an “injury in fact” as it is currently understood, and to use the Court’s recent 
decision in Summers v. Earth Island Institute to ground those theoretical objections in an actual 
case, and demonstrate the inadequacies of modern environmental standing doctrine.  The article 
concludes that modern standing doctrine has no rational basis in constitutional analysis or even 
reasoned jurisprudence, but rather stems from a series of decisions exhibiting confused and 
obscure reasoning.  Further, from a normative perspective, there is no reason to believe that the 
Constitution, either structurally via the doctrine of separation of powers or directly via Article 
III, requires plaintiffs to demonstrate “injury in fact.”  Finally, the Court’s decision in Summers 
upholding the injury in fact requirement demonstrates several important truths: the Court’s 
efforts to liberalize standing doctrine in several recent cases were insufficiently aggressive to  
accomplish a permanent shift, and the injury in fact doctrine has real negative implications both 
for the intellectual integrity of environmental standing law and for the environment itself. 
 
Introduction 
  Questions of standing-- who has it, what it means, why it exists-- have vexed 
environmental law scholars, practitioners, and plaintiffs since the inception of statutory 
environmental litigation almost fifty years ago.  The doctrine has become one of the most 
prominent features of modern environmental law, forcing environmental plaintiffs to jump 
through what are often impossibly high hoops just to get into court, regardless of the validity of 
their claims on the merits.  Standing jurisprudence in the context of environmental cases has 
been the subject of extensive controversy among legal scholars, with conservative thinkers 
typically supporting a high bar for standing and more progressive thinkers favoring greater 
access to courts. Standing law has shifted back and forth between these two poles several times 
2 over the course of the Supreme Court’s dealings with it.  In one of its most recent major standing 
decisions, Massachusetts v. EPA,
1 the Court came down on what is generally thought to be the 
liberal side of the debate, significantly broadening its application of the three-part test for 
standing farther than it ever had before.  In its most recent decision, Summers v. Earth Island 
Institute,
2 the Court reverted to a more conservative approach that relies on the stringent 
requirement of injury in fact. 
  In this article, I will argue that this approach is unjustified from a constitutional 
perspective, and that the Court needs to do more than it did in MA v. EPA to remedy the 
problems with standing doctrine.  While the Court’s opinion in MA v. EPA did represent a 
victory for advocates of liberal environmental standing law, the Court’s opinion did nothing to 
rectify any of the fundamental problems that make conservative standing doctrine so anathema to 
the ideals of environmental protection in the first place, and thereby set the stage for the 
environmental loss in Summers.  In acquiescing to using the basic test for standing set out by 
Justice Scalia in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife
3 in 1992, even while significantly liberalizing it, 
the Court in MA v. EPA gave that “Scalian standing”
4 test further precedential weight and 
thereby gave strength to a doctrine of standing that is deeply problematic for the goals of national 
environmental protection, as is demonstrated by the outcome of Summers and its potential 
environmental consequences.   
                                                 
1 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
2 No. 07-463, slip op. (U.S. Mar. 3, 2009). 
3 504 U.S. 553 (1992). 
4 Jamie Pleune, Is Scalian Standing the Next Lochner-ess Monster?, 38 Envtl. L. 273 (2008).  See also 
John Echeverria, Jon T. Zeidler, Barely Standing: The Erosion of Citizen “Standing” to Sue and Enforce 
Environmental Law, Georgetown University Environmental Policy Project (June 1999), available at 
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/research_archive/standing/BarelyStanding.pdf (referring to Justice 
Scalia “single-handedly transform[ing] the law of citizen standing in environmental cases”). 
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   Part I will trace the historical development of standing law, arguing that its roots, while 
purportedly constitutional, are in fact largely prudential in nature and have very tenuous ties to 
the Article III “case or controversy” requirement.  Those roots are based largely in judicial 
fabrication with minimal constitutional basis, and reflect outdated modes of jurisprudence that 
are incompatible with a collective effort to save the environment from exploitation and 
destruction. Part II will set out constitutional arguments against Scalian standing.  These 
arguments demonstrate the theoretical and practical inadequacy of that doctrine, which is 
fundamentally at odds with the best means that America has come up with to address the 
collective action problems that plague the pursuit of environmental protection: citizen 
enforcement of environmental laws and regulations.  Part III will discuss the Summers case and 
its consequences in detail, and argue that it demonstrates why the Courts’ liberal standing cases 
should not be considered anything more than pyrrhic victories for proponents of broader access 
to the courts for citizens and environmental groups.  I will argue that in order to achieve a 
doctrine of standing that is both intellectually and practically viable, the Court will need to go 
back to the drawing board, abandoning Scalian standing entirely as a failed experiment with 
potentially devastating environmental results. 
 
Part I: The Origins and History of Standing Law 
 
  In 1992, Justice Antonin Scalia definitively articulated modern standing doctrine when he 
denied standing to the plaintiffs in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
5 examined in more detail 
below.  In so doing, he explained that “[o]ver the years, our cases have established that the 
                                                 
5 504 U.S. 553 (1992). 
4 irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements.”
6  In order to achieve 
standing, a plaintiff must have (1) “suffered an ‘injury in fact.’”
7  This means “an invasion of a 
legally protected interest” which itself has two fundamental components-- the injury must be 
both “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural or hypothetical.’”
8  
In addition, (2) “there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct 
complained of—the injury has to be ‘fairly . . .  traceable to the challenged action of the 
defendant, and not . . . the result of the independent action of some third party not before the 
court.’”
9  Lastly, (3) “it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will 
be ‘redressed by a favorable opinion.’”
10  In this part I will trace back these elements of standing 
(with an emphasis on injury in fact) to their inceptions in case law, as well as explore their 
constitutional underpinnings (or lack thereof) and prudential justifications.  I will then follow 
those ideas through the early environmental cases, Defenders of Wildlife, and subsequent 
developments, all with the hope of demonstrating the confusion and inconsistency that has 
surrounded the doctrine and exhibited its lack of genuine constitutional origin.
11 
 
A. Injury In Fact 
 
                                                 
6 Id. at 560. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id at 561. 
11 See F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 275, 299 
(2008) (arguing that “historical practice…does not justify inserting the injury-in-fact requirement into 
Article III”). 
5 
   What makes Scalia’s decision in Defenders of Wildlife particularly notable is the fact that 
the plaintiffs were suing under the citizen suit provision of the Endangered Species Act,
12 which 
expressly authorized citizens to sue to enforce that Act’s provisions.  By insisting that plaintiffs 
did not have standing to sue despite this Congressionally created cause of action, Scalia 
ostensibly declared the citizen suit provision unconstitutional unless plaintiffs could prove an 
“injury in fact.”
13  As indicated above, the origins of this doctrine are somewhat hazy, and have 
no basis in the plain text of the Constitution.  While the injury in fact test is purportedly based in 
Article III of the Constitution, that Article states only that “[t]he judicial power shall extend to all 
cases . . . [and] controversies . . . .”
14  The story of how this vague phrase became the root of the 
“injury in fact” requirement is deeply confused.   
 Scholarship  and  jurisprudence on standing have identified two strains of standing 
doctrine, which have come together in puzzling ways to yield the injury in fact test.  Today, 
“constitutional standing” is that premised on the “constitutional minima” cited in Defenders of 
Wildlife, which are purportedly required by Article III.  “Prudential standing,” by contrast, 
focuses on whether a plaintiff has a cause of action under a relevant statute; today, that test is 
known as the “zone of interests test,” because it inquires whether the plaintiff is within the zone 
of interests contemplated by the statute.
15  Both tests have undergone significant evolution over 
the course of the twentieth century.  It is difficult to say which strain of reasoning is responsible 
for the idea of injury in fact; while today it is claimed under the constitutional heading, its first 
                                                 
12 16 U.S.C. §1540(g) (1973). 
13 Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 576-578.  See also William W. Buzbee, Standing and the Statutory 
Universe, 11 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F. 247, 253 (2001). An alternative way to view his outlook is to 
suggest that Congress would not have intended to abrogate the constitutional injury requirement, and that 
therefore citizen suit provisions are not intended to confer standing on people who do not have an injury 
in fact. 
14 U.S. Const. art. 3, §2. 
15 See Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). 
6 appearance in case law, as seen below, actually came in the context of an opinion discussing 
prudential standing requirements.
16    
 
  1. Constitutional Standing 
  Different scholars have placed the emergence of the constitutional strand of standing law 
at different points in time, most no earlier than the 1920s.
17  As early as 1831, however, the 
Court was struggling with issues of justiciability and separation of powers, stating that when 
resolution of a case “would seem to depend for relief upon the exercise of political power,” it  
“appropriately devolv[es] upon the executive, and not the judicial department of the government. 
This court can grant relief so far, only, as the rights of persons or property are drawn in question, 
and have been infringed.”
18  It is clear from reasoning like this that the history of requiring a 
plaintiff to be injured in some way is firmly rooted in constitutional thinking, and this 
requirement is both sensible and justified based on separation of powers principles.  It is the 
further development of the injury doctrine, and the restriction of what qualifies as a “right” to be 
“infringed,” that starts to become more problematic. 
  The 1923 case of Frothingham v. Mellon exemplifies the more specific move of limiting 
standing based specifically on the jurisdictional grant of Article III.
19  In that case, the Supreme 
Court held that it could not assume jurisdiction over a suit in which an individual taxpayer 
sought to sue the government for what she argued was unconstitutional misuse of her tax dollars.  
                                                 
16 See id.; Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).  See also Cass Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan, 
91 Mich. L. Rev. 163, 169  (1992). 
17 See id. at 180; see also Timothy C. Hodits, The Fatal Flaw of Standing: A Proposal for an Article I 
Tribunal for Environmental Claims, 84 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1907, 1910 (2006) (asserting that a majority of 
commentators find no jurisprudence relevant to modern standing law before 1920 and collecting articles). 
18 Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831) (Thompson, J. dissenting). 
19 262 U.S. 447 (1923). 
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 Citing concerns about separation of powers similar to those seen in the earlier cases, the Court 
stated,  
[w]e have no power per se to review and annul acts of Congress on the ground 
that they are unconstitutional. That question may be considered only when the 
justification for some direct injury suffered or threatened, presenting a justiciable 
issue, is made to rest upon such an act.
20   
 
To assume jurisdiction without the presence of an individual stake, the Court said, “would be, 
not to decide a judicial controversy, but to assume a position of authority over the governmental 
acts of another and coequal department, an authority which plainly we do not possess.”
21  Here 
one can see the injury requirement, while still apparently based in separation of powers concerns, 
implicitly tied into the jurisdictional grant of Article III via the phrase “judicial controversy.”  
The Court’s move here is to say that any assumption of jurisdiction that would infringe upon the 
other branches of government is by definition not a judicial controversy within the meaning of 
Article III.   While this move begs the question somewhat, its doing so is largely harmless given 
the legitimacy of the underlying rationale. 
  To this point there has been nothing unreasonable in the development of an injury 
requirement-- the Court has consistently sought to limit its own authority to cases it deems 
justiciable without straying into the realm of policy-making. While its logically questionable 
invocation of Article III is somewhat superfluous, the constitutional foundation for its decisions 
is still strong; this is because separation of powers principles embodied in the general structure of 
the Constitution provide a strong rationale for the Court’s desire to avoid taking on 
fundamentally political issues.  In one element of its opinion in Frothingham, however, the Court 
took a step that eviscerated plaintiffs’ ability to get into court, and it did so without providing any 
                                                 
20 Id. at 488. 
21 Id. at 489. 
8 cogent constitutional justification.  That step was to say that Frothingham’s injury, by virtue of 
being “shared with millions of others,” was insufficient “for an appeal to the preventive powers 
of a court of equity.”
22  In justifying this conclusion, the Court noted: 
The administration of any statute, likely to produce additional taxation to be 
imposed upon a vast number of taxpayers, the extent of whose several liability is 
indefinite and constantly changing, is essentially a matter of public and not of 
individual concern. If one taxpayer may champion and litigate such a cause, then 
every other taxpayer may do the same, not only in respect of the statute here 
under review, but also in respect of every other appropriation act and statute 
whose administration requires the outlay of public money, and whose validity 
may be questioned. The bare suggestion of such a result, with its attendant 
inconveniences, goes far to sustain the conclusion which we have reached, that a 
suit of this character cannot be maintained.
23 
 
The Court therefore held that plaintiffs’ injuries, even if legitimate, become non-justiciable 
simply by virtue of being shared with many others; its only explicit normative basis for doing so, 
moreover, was the “attendant inconveniences” that would result from holding otherwise.
24  Note 
that the stated justification for what would ultimately become the particularization requirement in 
Scalian standing is little other than convenience (and not any explicit constitutional concern). 
                                                 
22 Id. at 487. 
23 Id. 
24 The Court appears to have made the erroneous assumption that any harm shared by a large number of 
people is fundamentally political by nature and therefore should not be justiciable.  This assumption, and 
the resultant particularization requirement, pose an obvious practical and ethical problem, elucidated by 
Justice Stewart in his opinion for the Court in the SCRAP case (discussed later in this Part, see infra notes 
64-69 and accompanying text): “To deny standing to persons who are in fact injured simply because 
many others are also injured, would mean that the most injurious and widespread Government actions 
could be questioned by nobody. We cannot accept that conclusion.” United States v. Students 
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973).  Justice Souter expressed a 
similar concern in a memo to Justice Scalia regarding the draft majority opinion in Defenders of Wildlife: 
“Despite ambiguous dicta in some of our cases, I doubt anyone would have standing to sue on the basis of 
a concrete injury that everyone else has suffered; Congress might, for instance, grant everyone standing to 
challenge government action that would rip open the ozone layer and expose all Americans to unhealthy 
doses of radiation.  Yet the repeated references to a particularity requirement . . . draw that conclusion 
into doubt.”  Memorandum from Justice David Souter to Justice Antonin Scalia (May 28, 1992) (on file 
with author).  See also Robert V. Percival, Massachusetts v. EPA: Escaping the Common Law’s Growing 
Shadow, 2007 Sup. Ct. Rev. 111, 129 (2007) (describing standing as “the notion that litigants should only 
have access to court when the harm they assert is neither too small nor too large, but rather ‘just right’--a 
kind of ‘Goldilocks’ theory of standing”). 
9 
  In  Doremus v. Board of Education,
25 decided in 1952, the Court applied this idea again, 
once again denying a taxpayer standing to sue. Quoting the companion case to Frothingham, the 
Court said,  
Without disparaging the availability of the remedy by taxpayer's action to restrain 
unconstitutional acts which result in direct pecuniary injury, we reiterate what the 
Court said of a federal statute as equally true when a state Act is assailed: ‘The 
party who invokes the power must be able to show, not only that the statute is 
invalid, but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some 
direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some 
indefinite way in common with people generally.’
26 
 
This statement does not necessarily mirror the strict principle from Frothingham that injury is 
insufficient if shared; indeed, the statement here read literally does not necessarily preclude the 
possibility that a direct injury shared among many people would be sufficient to get into court.  
However, the Court again seems to use some questionable logic in its holding, implying that the 
injury at issue in the case is determined to be insufficiently direct simply by virtue of its being 
shared.  This implies that broadly shared injuries are a death knell for plaintiffs’ hopes of getting 
into court.  Further underscoring this point, the Court that same year, in Adler v. Board of 
Education,
27 denied standing to eight plaintiffs who sought to enjoin a waste of taxpayer funds 
under a New York statute.  It argued the following in regard to plaintiffs’ argument that the 
statute gave them standing to sue: 
New York is free to determine how the views of its courts on matters of 
constitutionality are to be invoked. But its action cannot of course confer 
jurisdiction on this Court, limited as that is by the settled construction of Article 
III of the Constitution. We cannot entertain, as we again recognize this very day, a 
constitutional claim at the instance of one whose interest has no material 
significance and is undifferentiated from the mass of his fellow citizens.
28 
 
                                                 
25 342 U.S. 429 (1952). 
26 Id. at 435. 
27  342 U.S. 485 (1952). 
28 Id. at 501. 
10 Again, the court here commits the logical fallacy of assuming that a claim that is undifferentiated 
is not materially significant.  Moreover, the Court offers Article III as the basis for the 
proposition that shared injuries are not justiciable.  However, the only citation the Court offers 
for the above statement is to Doremus, which in turn (as seen above) relies for its conclusions on 
the reasoning in Frothingham, which was based not on Article III but on the avoidance of 
“inconvenience.”  Therefore the Article III basis for the particularization requirement seems to 
have been pulled largely out of thin air. 
  The Court continued to invoke Article III as a justification for the injury requirement 
outside the context of particularization as well, though the underlying justification shifted over 
time away from the separation of powers concerns that initially legitimated the doctrine.
29  In 
1962, the Court couched the question of injury in the following terms:  “Have the appellants 
alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete 
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends 
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions?”
30  The idea seems to be that only by 
asserting an injury can a plaintiff assure the proper function of the adversary process.  By 1968, 
this “concrete adverseness” justification had worked its way into constitutional discourse: “in 
terms of Article III limitations on federal court jurisdiction, the question of standing is related 
only to whether the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context 
and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution.”
31  In terms of providing an 
Article III justification for the injury requirement, this line of reasoning begs the question just as 
the separation of powers reasoning did-- rather than reasoning from the text as to what Article III 
                                                 
29 See Hessick, supra note 12, at 299-300. 
30 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 203 (1962). 
31 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-101 (1968). 
11 
 requires, the Court made its own judgment about how courts should properly function and read 
that judgment back into Article III.   
  While constitutional standing continued to develop on its own terms, it ran head on into 
prudential standing in 1970 with the Court’s decision in Association of Data Processing Service 
Organizations, Inc. v. Camp.
32  Before investigating the progression of the constitutional injury 
requirement after that point, it makes sense to briefly canvas the development of the injury 
requirement in the prudential standing context. 
 
  2. Prudential Standing 
  While courts have been citing prudential concerns since the early days of the republic
33 
(indeed, much of the reasoning in the early cases cited above might be more aptly characterized 
as prudential than constitutional), the development of prudential standing as relevant to the 
purposes of this Part can be traced to the progressive period and the New Deal.
34  It is important 
to note explicitly that in many instances, the line between prudential and constitutional reasoning 
is not always clear, especially in the early twentieth century cases.
35  The two are almost more 
readily distinguished by the context in which they arise than by the reasoning they utilize.  The 
                                                 
32 397 U.S. 150 (1970). 
33 See, e.g., Owings v. Norwood’s Lessee, 5 Cranch 344 (1809); Henderson v. State of Tennessee, 51 U.S. 
311 (1850); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. 518 (1851) (Daniel, J. dissenting); 
Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. 50 (1868); Tyler v. Judges of Court of Registration, 179 U.S. 405 (1900); 
Hendrick v. State of Maryland, 235 U.S. 610 (1915). 
34 See Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing at the Crossroads: The Roberts Court in Historical Perspective, 83 
Notre Dame L. Rev. 875, 890-91 (2008); Sunstein, supra note 12, at 179. 
35 For example, Justice Brandeis at one point noted, “The Court has frequently called attention to the 
‘great gravity and delicacy’ of its function in passing upon the validity of an act of Congress; and has 
restricted exercise of this function by rigid insistence that the jurisdiction of federal courts is limited to 
actual cases and controversies; and that they have no power to give advisory opinions.”  Ashwander v. 
Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 345-46 (1936) (Brandeis, J. concurring). While he made no 
explicit reference to Article III, he did utilize the specific phrase “cases and controversies,” rendering the 
reasoning at least implicitly constitutional.  A similar phenomenon occurred in Frothingham with the 
phrase “judicial controversy.”  See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.   
12 prudential standing test is entirely statutory today, which is no coincidence given its origins in 
the period comprising the rise of the regulatory state. 
  Most scholars agree that modern prudential standing requirements arose as a result of 
progressive Justices’ efforts to protect progressive and New Deal legislation from attack by 
industry.
36  The Justices primarily responsible were Brandeis and Frankfurter.
37  Between them 
they created what is referred to as the “legal right” test for standing, wherein to establish 
standing, litigants had to show that a legal right, conferred upon them by statutory or common 
law, had been infringed.
38  This served their ultimate purpose of protecting regulatory action 
because competitors could not satisfy this test, not having any legal rights at stake; only those 
directly subject to agency action could have their legal rights injured.  In 1930, in a case about 
railroad rate regulation, a railroad company sought to challenge the validity of an ICC finding of 
undue prejudice.  Justice Brandeis, denying standing, said the company did not have  
the right to maintain an independent suit, to vacate and set aside the order. Such a 
suit can be brought by a shipper only where a right of his own is alleged to have 
been violated by the order . . . .  In the case at bar, the appellants have no 
independent right which is violated by the order to cease and desist.
39   
 
Similarly, in Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority,
40 the Court 
summarized the doctrine as follows:  
The appellants invoke the doctrine that one threatened with direct and special 
injury by the act of an agent of the government which, but for statutory authority 
for its performance, would be a violation of his legal rights, may challenge the 
validity of the statute in a suit against the agent. The principle is without 
application unless the right invaded is a legal right,-one of property, one arising 
                                                 
36 See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 179; Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of 
Self-Governance, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 1371, 1458 (1988). 
37 Id. at 1374. 
38 RONALD A. CASS, COLIN S. DIVER & JACK M. BEERMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 270 (5th ed. 2006).  
39 Alexander Sprunt & Son, Inc. v. United States, 281 U.S. 249, 255 (1930). 
40 306 U.S. 118 (1939). 
13 
 out of contract, one protected against tortious invasion, or one founded on a 
statute which confers a privilege.
41 
 
The legal rights test was not grounded explicitly on constitutional principles, reflecting its 
motivating factors.  Instead, as the Court’s language demonstrates, it was largely based in the 
relevant statutory language, as well as the common law requirement that plaintiffs have some 
legal cause of action.
42  Both of these sources, as well as the explicit language of the test, made it 
clear that Congress had the capacity to create judicially cognizable injury by legislation.
43  On a 
very broad scale, this is what Congress did when it passed the Administrative Procedure Act
44 
(APA) in 1946, which made its own provision for judicial review of agency action. 
  Section 702 of the APA provides that “A person suffering legal wrong because of agency 
action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant 
statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.”
45  Lower courts interpreted APA judicial review to 
allow both objects and beneficiaries of agency action to get into court, in keeping with prior case 
law such as Sanders Brothers.
46  This was an expansion of the legal right test to the extent that it 
understood people who stood to benefit from regulation as having legal rights, as opposed to 
merely non-legal interests, at stake.  The Supreme Court’s first treatment of the legal right test in 
this era, however, took an unpredictable turn, and introduced for the first time the concept of 
“injury in fact.” 
                                                 
41 Id. at 119. 
42 See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 180-81; CASS ET AL., supra note 38 at 271. 
43 See Federal Communications Commission v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940) 
(confirming that Congress could grant standing to competitors to challenge licensing awards); Perkins v. 
Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940) (noting that injury alone cannot create a cognizable “source of 
legal rights in the absence of constitutional legislation recognizing it as such”).  See also CASS ET AL., 
supra note 38, at 271. 
44 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-711 (1946). 
45 5 U.S.C. § 702. 
46 See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 183, n. 97 (collecting cases). 
14  
 3.  Collision  Point 
  The term “injury in fact” first appeared in the companion cases of Data Processing and 
Barlow v. Collins
47 in 1970.  The term made its debut amidst reasoning drawing on both 
constitutional and prudential principles, presented such that it is unclear from which category 
(and to which category) it applies.  The following close reading of Data Processing aims not 
necessarily to advocate one particular understanding of the opinion, but rather to demonstrate the 
extent to which its reasoning is confused, especially with regard to the distinction between 
constitutional and prudential standing requirements.   
  Data Processing considered the question of whether the data processors’ organization, as 
a competitor, had standing to challenge the Comptroller of the Currency’s ruling that allowed 
banks to perform data processing services for their customers.  Beginning his discussion with the 
mysterious assertion that “generalizations about standing to sue are largely worthless as such,” 
Justice Douglas proceeded to discuss both the constitutional and prudential elements of standing 
doctrine.
48  He introduced the constitutional issue by explaining that  
the question of standing in the federal courts is to be considered in the framework 
of Article III which restricts judicial power to ‘cases' and ‘controversies.’ As we 
recently stated in Flast v. Cohen [citation omitted],  ‘(I)n terms of Article III 
limitations on federal court jurisdiction, the question of standing is related only to 
whether the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary 
context and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution.’
49 
 
Note that separation of powers concerns appear to have dropped out of the picture entirely, 
replaced by the more abstract concern with sufficient adversarial context.  Using this concept as 
his “Article III starting point,” Douglas proceeded to distinguish the Flast taxpayer suit context 
                                                 
47 397 U.S. 159 (1970). 
48 Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 151. 
49 Id. at 151-152. 
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 from the competitor suit at issue.
50  He did so by introducing the concept of injury in fact, noting 
that “[t]he first question is whether the plaintiff alleges that the challenged action has caused him 
injury in fact, economic or otherwise.”
51  Clearly a competitor whose business will be reduced 
has suffered an injury in fact of the economic variety, whereas, Douglas implicitly presumed, a 
taxpayer does not have a constitutionally cognizable injury in fact at all.  This second conclusion 
has little to support it, given that the taxpayer clearly is experiencing some sort of injury that has 
driven him to court in the first place.  In truth, Douglas offered no explanation for his conception 
of injury in fact at all. 
  To determine what is actually doing the work of distinguishing the taxpayer here, one 
would have to determine what Douglas meant by “injury in fact,” and what categories thereof he 
meant to encompass in the phrase “economic or otherwise.”   Unfortunately, he offered little to 
work with in this regard.  His next step was to object to the Court of Appeals’ approach to the 
case, explaining that the lower court “viewed the matter differently.”
52   It is unclear whether 
“the matter” refers to the case in its entirety, the injury in fact requirement, or the specific injury 
determination in this case.  The Court of Appeals had applied the legal right test and denied 
standing on that ground.  Douglas brushed off this approach, stating that “the ‘legal interest’ test 
goes to the merits.”
53  He then offered his own approach to standing, without explaining whether 
he was expounding on the injury in fact requirement or discussing a new requirement altogether. 
                                                 
50 Id.  
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id.  This is a puzzling assertion; the legal interest test had been understood as a determination of 
standing to this point.  The assertion that it “goes to the merits” is, while not an unreasonable view of the 
doctrine, not in keeping with how it had been applied to date.  See, e.g., The Chicago Junction Case, 264 
U.S. 258 (1924) (finding that plaintiffs’ potential monetary loss was a sufficient legal interest to allow 
them to bring suit and not discussing that loss on the merits). 
16 The question of standing is different.  It concerns, apart from the ‘case’ or 
‘controversy’ test, the question whether the interest sought to be protected by the 
complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated 
by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question. Thus the Administrative 
Procedure Act grants standing to a person ‘aggrieved by agency action within the 
meaning of a relevant statute.’
54   
 
Douglas here introduced what has become the mainstay of modern prudential standing-- the 
zone of interests test.  As noted above, however, it is unclear if he intended to refine the method 
of determining whether an injury in fact had occurred, or if he meant to create a new test distinct 
from the injury in fact requirement.  It is also unclear whether Douglas intended to establish a 
prudential or a constitutional test.  He stated only that the zone of interests test is separate from 
the cases and controversies requirement.  This leaves some question as to whether the zone of 
interests test is somehow constitutional in nature without being directly linked to the case and 
controversy requirement.  There are several ways to read the opinion that yield different answers 
to these questions. 
  Given the subsequent reference to APA judicial review, it is possible that Douglas meant 
the zone of interests requirement strictly as an interpretation thereof.  However, it is equally 
possible that Douglas was merely referencing the APA as support for his reading of a 
constitutional standing requirement.  This possibility is supported by the fact that Douglas 
introduced the zone of interests test as part of his repudiation of the appellate court’s method of 
defining injury, which he initially discussed in the context of injury in fact.  The third possibility 
is that he meant the zone of interests test to be the newest iteration of prudential standing.  
However, this interpretation is complicated by the fact that Douglas’ next move in the opinion 
was to invoke prudential standing as a separate category: 
 
                                                 
54 Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 154. 
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 Apart from Article III jurisdictional questions, problems of standing, as resolved 
by this Court for its own governance, have involved a ‘rule of self-restraint.’. . . 
Congress can, of course, resolve the question one way or another, save as the 
requirements of Article III dictate otherwise.
55 
 
Douglas’ transition here-- “apart from Article III jurisdictional questions”-- suggests that 
everything discussed prior to this point had been an Article III jurisdictional question.  If that is 
the case, then the zone of interests test as well as the injury in fact test (if they are in fact 
different) are both Article III tests.  Douglas offered constitutional justifications for neither. 
  The purpose of the above analysis is to show that drawing any sort of doctrinal conclusion 
from Data Processing is at best a questionable proposition.  Given the lack of explanation, 
justification, and clarity in the opinion, its critical status in the development of standing law is 
unfortunate and undesirable.  However, Data Processing has been taken to create two new and 
separate tests for standing-- a constitutional inquiry into “injury in fact,” and a prudential inquiry 
into the zone of interests contemplated by the statute at issue.  This interpretation has become 
mainstream despite the fact that a new constitutional injury requirement emerged from the 
rejection of an old prudential requirement, not to mention that this new injury requirement made 
what was once a purely legal inquiry into a purely factual one with no explanation or justification 
whatsoever.
56 
  What did Douglas mean by “injury in fact, economic or otherwise?”  It is impossible to tell 
from the opinion, but the general idea seems to have been to expand the concept of injury beyond 
the simple violation of a statutory or common law right.  Under the new test, any harm to one’s 
interests is sufficient injury for the purposes of getting into court as long as those interests fall 
                                                 
55 Id.  
56 See Jonathan Poisner, Environmental Values and Judicial Review after Lujan: Two Critiques of the 
Separation of Powers Theory of Standing, 18 Ecology L. Q. 335, 340-41 (1991). 
18 within the zone of interests protected or regulated by the relevant statute.
57  What is unclear is 
how broadly the test was meant to open the courthouse doors.  Douglas did note that certain non-
traditionally legal interests would qualify, stating that such interests might reflect ‘aesthetic, 
conservational, and recreational’ as well as economic values.”
58  Other categories of interests 
remain ambiguous-- Is a purely emotional injury an injury in fact?  What about a moral outrage?  
Can purportedly illegal action comprise an injury in fact without concrete damage to one’s 
concrete interests?  Data Processing does not make these issues clear, and the Court has 
interpreted the requirement variably in subsequent opinions. 
 
  4. Moving Forward After Data Processors 
  In 1972, the Court in Sierra Club v. Morton
59 began the process of fleshing out the holding 
in Data Processing.  The case considered the question of whether the Sierra Club had standing to 
sue as an organization to prevent the development of the Mineral King valley.  The Court 
restated its holding from Data Processing, explaining that in that case,  
we held more broadly that persons had standing to obtain judicial review of 
federal agency action under §10 of the APA where they had alleged that the 
challenged action had caused them ‘injury in fact,’ and where the alleged injury 
was to an interest ‘arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or 
regulated’ by the statutes that the agencies were claimed to have violated.
60   
 
The Court added, in a footnote, “In deciding this case we do not reach any questions concerning 
the meaning of the ‘zone of interests’ test or its possible application to the facts here 
                                                 
57 The “zone of interests” concept, somewhat ironically, has been interpreted loosely by the same Justices 
who support narrow standing requirements.  See generally Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997). 
58 Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 154. 
59 405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
60 Id. at 733. 
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 presented.”
61  Interestingly, the Court couched the injury in fact and zone of interest tests both 
solely in terms of the APA, forsaking any discussion of a constitutional injury requirement.  The 
Court concluded that the alleged injury in fact was insufficient, not because it was 
aesthetic/conservational/recreational in nature, but rather because the Sierra Club had alleged an 
injury to the concerns of the organization rather than a concrete injury to itself or its members.  
In so doing, the Court stated that  
the fact that particular environmental interests are shared by the many rather than 
the few does not make them less deserving of legal protection through the judicial 
process. But the ‘injury in fact’ test requires more than an injury to a cognizable 
interest. It requires that the party seeking review be himself among the injured.
62 
 
 Sierra  Club is usually viewed as a victory for environmental advocates, despite the denial 
of standing in the specific circumstances, because it affirmed the idea that broadly shared 
environmental interests were appropriate subjects for judicial review (and ultimately allowed 
plaintiffs to amend their complaint).
63  However, in the course of its holding, the Court actually 
significantly narrowed the potential meaning of the injury in fact test from where it had been left 
after Data Processing.  The Court noted that the Sierra Club’s longstanding interest in the 
preservation of the Sierra Nevada Mountains was not enough to render the destruction of that 
wilderness an injury in fact to the organization.   
The Sierra Club is a large and long-established organization, with a historic 
commitment to the cause of protecting our Nation's natural heritage from man's 
                                                 
61 Id. at 733 n.5. 
62 Id. at 734-735. 
63 See, e.g., Shi-Ling Hsu, The Identifiability Bias in Environmental Law, 35 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 433, 466 
(2008)(“The decision was deemed to be something of a victory for the environmental movement because 
of the recipe laid out in the opinion for meeting standing requirements….”); Emily Longfellow, Friends 
of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services: A New Look at Environmental Standing, 24 Environs 
Envtl. L. & Pol’y. J. 3, 17 (2000) (“While the Court followed its standing doctrine in requiring the 
plaintiff to be among those injured, the decision was a victory for environmental plaintiffs because the 
Court recognized that an injury can involve harm to aesthetic and environmental values, not only 
economic values.”). 
20 depredations. But if a ‘special interest’ in this subject were enough to entitle the 
Sierra Club to commence this litigation, there would appear to be no objective 
basis upon which to disallow a suit by any other bona fide ‘special interest’ 
organization however small or short-lived. And if any group with a bona fide 
‘special interest’ could initiate such litigation, it is difficult to perceive why any 
individual citizen with the same bona fide special interest would not also be 
entitled to do so.
64 
 
It is difficult to understand why the threatened injury to a “special interest” should not qualify as 
an injury in fact, whether for groups or for individual citizens.  That conservational interests 
were specifically included as cognizable interests in Data Processing makes this even more 
puzzling.   
  What the Court seems to be doing here is limiting injury in fact to those injuries that affect 
concrete or tangible interests-- the number of dollars one possesses, the ability to physically hike 
in aesthetically pristine area, the possibility of viewing an endangered specimen.  While this is 
nowhere explicitly stated, the rationale for this move is presumably to read “in fact” as doing no 
work unless it refers to some element of the concrete world.  The negative consequences and 
implications of this view will be discussed later on.  For the purposes of this section, it is 
sufficient to note that it is equally if not more plausible to read “in fact” as meaning simply “in 
truth;” that is, the person must experience genuine negative effects from the purported injury, but 
not necessarily in concrete terms.  Under this reading, the Sierra Club or any other individual 
with an interest in conservation would be injured in fact by the threatened destruction of the 
Mineral King valley.  The Court chose to reject this reading, but once again, in what has become 
a familiar pattern, declined to explain why.
65  Despite this narrowing of the scope of the injury in 
fact test, however, the Court’s continued emphasis on the connection between the APA and the 
                                                 
64 Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 739-40. 
65 The only underlying justification we see in the entire opinion is a reference back to the necessity for 
adversity and “personal stake” with citations to Baker v. Carr and Flast v. Cohen, neither of which does 
the work of justifying the Court’s narrow reading of injury in fact. 
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 injury in fact test was potentially good news for environmental plaintiffs, insofar as it had the 
potential to limit the application of that test to cases brought under the APA. 
  The next major environmental standing decision from the Supreme Court came in 1973, in 
the case of United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP).
66  
SCRAP sued under the APA to challenge an ICC rate ruling that would increase shipping costs, 
and thereby render the shipping of recycled materials prohibitively costly, which would in turn 
injure the environment.  Despite the attenuated and broad nature of these claimed injuries, the 
Court found that the plaintiffs had standing.  It brushed off the contention that the injury 
complained of could be shared by any number of people, saying that “[t]o deny standing to 
persons who are in fact injured simply because many others are also injured, would mean that the 
most injurious and widespread Government actions could be questioned by nobody.  We cannot 
accept that conclusion.”
67  Further explaining that “pleadings must be something more than an 
ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable,”
68 the Court nevertheless held that “we deal 
here simply with the pleadings in which the appellees alleged a specific and perceptible harm 
that distinguished them from other citizens who had not used the natural resources that were 
claimed to be affected.”
69  As in Sierra Club, the key factor was therefore the plaintiff/appellees’
factual use of the specific natural resources that would purportedly suffer due to higher rail r
 
ates.   
                                                
  The injury in fact test in this opinion, however, was also explicitly tied to the APA:  
“‘Injury in fact’ reflects the statutory requirement that a person be ‘adversely affected’ or 
‘aggrieved,’ and it serves to distinguish a person with a direct stake in the outcome of a 
 
66 412 U.S. 669 (1973). 
67 Id. at 688. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 689. 
22 litigation-- even though small-- from a person with a mere interest in the problem.”
70 
Interestingly, any constitutional basis for the injury in fact test seems to have fallen by the 
wayside-- neither Article III specifically nor the constitution in general is mentioned once in the 
entire standing section of the opinion.  The Court thereby left unclear to what extent the injury in 
fact test applied to suits brought under statutes other than the APA, of which there was to be a 
great proliferation over the next several years thanks to new environmental legislation including 
citizen suit provisions.  This shift in the statutory landscape perhaps explains why the Court did 
not address the question of environmental standing again for nearly twenty years. 
  In 1990, the Court decided Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation.
71  This was another suit 
brought under the APA, by conservation groups seeking to enjoin the Bureau of Land 
Management from engaging in its “land withdrawal review program,” which would have opened 
up certain public lands for mining and other private uses.  Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, 
found that the program in general was too broad to constitute “agency action” within the 
meaning of §702, and therefore was unreviewable.  The Court also upheld the District Court’s 
finding that the plaintiffs had not alleged sufficiently specific “injury in fact” because they 
claimed only that they used lands “in the vicinity” of the lands at issue in the case.  This is a 
significant narrowing from the injury in fact test in SCRAP, where the injury was not only 
significantly more attenuated but also much more general.  The Court in National Wildlife 
Federation expected the plaintiffs to identify and experience the exact acreage at risk in order for 
damage to that land to constitute an injury in fact.  Scalia noted that “[t]he SCRAP opinion, 
whose expansive expression of what would suffice for §702 review under its particular facts has 
never since been emulated by this Court, is of no relevance here, since it involved not a Rule 56 
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 motion for summary judgment but a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss on the pleadings.”
72  Scalia 
here made explicit his crusade to narrow the injury in fact test and foreshadowed what was to 
come. 
  In 1992, the Court decided Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
73 in which Scalia laid out his 
three part test for standing.
74  Before analyzing his approach to injury in fact in this case, 
however, I will more briefly investigate the origins of the causation and redressability prongs in 
order to discuss Scalia’s approach as a whole.   
     
B. Causation and Redressability 
 
  Causation and redressability are really more elements of injury in fact than they are 
separate requirements of Scalia’s standing test.  These elements were formalized in two cases 
from the early seventies: Linda R.S. v. Richard D.
75 and Warth v. Seldin.
76  Linda R.S. concerned 
the mother of an illegitimate child who sought to enjoin a prosecutor from utilizing discretion to 
avoid prosecuting recalcitrant fathers of illegitimate children.  The Court held that she did not 
have standing to sue, finding that she had “failed to allege a sufficient nexus between her injury 
and the government action which she attacks to justify judicial intervention.”
77  The Court 
further explained, referencing the companion case to Frothingham, that “the bare existence of an 
abstract injury meets only the first half of the standing requirement. ‘The party who invokes 
                                                 
72 Id. at 889. 
73 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
74 See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text. 
75 410 U.S. 614 (1973). 
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77 Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 617-18. 
24 (judicial) power must be able to show . . . that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of 
sustaining some direct injury as the result of (a statute’s) enforcement.’”
78  While the idea of 
injury being traceable to a party or action is in some sense implicit in the concept of a case or 
controversy, this was the first case to make that requirement explicit and central to its denial of 
standing.
79   
  The Court in Linda R.S. also made a point about redressability, demonstrating that at least 
to some extent it is the flip side of causation.  Redressability as a concept inquires, “if the court 
rules in your favor, will the injury be redressed?”  Of course, the definition of “redress” will be 
an important sticking point in terms of what the doctrine requires.
80  In this case, the Court 
seemed to interpret the concept narrowly, holding that if  
appellant were granted the requested relief, it would result only in the jailing of 
the child's father. The prospect that prosecution will, at least in the future, result in 
payment of support can, at best, be termed only speculative. Certainly the ‘direct’ 
relationship between the alleged injury and the claim sought to be adjudicated, 
which previous decisions of this Court suggest is a prerequisite of standing, is 
absent in this case.
81 
 
Redressability was found lacking here because there was no way to know whether a court ruling 
would actually attenuate the injury at stake (because of inherent uncertainties in the prosecution 
process, etc). This ruling can be squared with SCRAP insofar as there, at least, the fundamental 
cause of the injury (the rate increase) would be removed by the Court’s ruling in SCRAP’s favor, 
whereas here a court ruling will affect the fundamental cause of the injury (recalcitrant father) 
only indirectly.  Whether this distinction is a reasonable one is less clear-- presumably a court 
                                                 
78 Id. at 618 (quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923)). 
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 ruling will at least help resolve the plaintiff’s injury in Linda R.S., and it is unclear where the 
Court means to draw the line in its redressability analysis.
82   
  Warth concerned a group of plaintiffs who sought to challenge a town’s zoning ordinance 
on the grounds that it prevented people of low and moderate income from living in the town.  
Ruling that the plaintiffs did not have standing, the Court cited Linda R.S. in explaining the 
concepts of causation and redressability as follows:  
But there remains the question whether petitioners' inability to locate suitable 
housing in Penfield reasonably can be said to have resulted, in any concretely 
demonstrable way, from respondents' alleged constitutional and statutory 
infractions. Petitioners must allege facts from which it reasonably could be 
inferred that, absent the respondents' restrictive zoning practices, there is a 
substantial probability that they would have been able to purchase or lease in 
Penfield and that, if the court affords the relief requested, the asserted inability of 
petitioners will be removed.
83 
 
This seems to suggest a “substantial probability” test for the causation and redressability 
questions, meaning that the plaintiff’s injury would be substantially likely not to exist absent the 
challenged behavior, and that a court ruling in the plaintiff’s favor would be substantially likely 
to remedy the injury.  Of course substantial likelihood is a flexible concept, so this test does little 
to determine what injuries will qualify as sufficiently caused and redressable.  At other points in 
the opinion, the language is more exacting, stating that “to establish that, in fact, the asserted 
injury was the consequence of the defendants’ actions, or that prospective relief will remove the 
harm” is a “minimum requirement of Article III.”
84  The Court’s holding was actually fairly 
narrow, however: “We hold only that a plaintiff who seeks to challenge exclusionary zoning 
practices must allege specific, concrete facts demonstrating that the challenged practices harm 
                                                 
82 This problem would later result in the major disagreement between the majority and Chief Justice 
Roberts’ dissent in MA v. EPA.  See infra notes 128-32 and accompanying text. 
83 Warth, 422 U.S. at 504. 
84 Id. at 505. 
26 him, and that he personally would benefit in a tangible way from the court's intervention.”
85  The 
Court’s choice of words reveals the extent to which the causation and redressability requirements 
are somewhat empty of substance, given that they leave open the possibility that a partial redress 
(“benefit in a tangible way,” rather than “would have his injury entirely abated”) will suffice-- 
thereby creating a line-drawing problem just like that in Linda R.S.   
  
C. Scalian Standing 
  This was the status of standing when Scalia wrote Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife-- vague 
and unspecific, certain that justiciability required some sort of injury and associated personal 
stake, but unclear as to exactly what qualified as injury under what circumstances.  Scalia’s 
opinion treated this uncertainty as if it did not exist, carefully crafting a standing test that, while 
appearing to be generously supported by precedent, does not do justice to the subtleties of the 
jurisprudence involved.
86 
  Defenders of Wildlife involved a suit by the conservation group Defenders of Wildlife 
against the Secretary of the Interior, seeking to challenge his interpretation of a provision of the 
Endangered Species Act.
87  That provision, §7(a)(2), requires every federal agency to ensure via 
consultation with the Secretary of the Interior that its activity does not jeopardize the continued 
existence of any endangered species.  While the Interior Department originally interpreted §7 to 
be international in scope, it shifted its position in a regulation promulgated in 1986 to interpret 
the provision “to require consultation only for actions taken in the United States or on the high 
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 seas.”
88  This decision allowed for the unregulated progress of certain development projects 
overseas that threatened the habitats of several endangered species. 
  Plaintiffs sought to establish standing based on the affidavits of two members who had 
traveled to Egypt and Sri Lanka to see the Nile crocodile and the Asian elephant and leopard, 
respectively.  Both claimed that they had a strong interest in seeing the endangered animals 
again, and that the habitat destruction attending the development projects would inhibit their 
ability to do so.  The Court found the affidavits inadequate to establish standing because the 
members did not have specific travel plans for returning, and therefore their injury was deemed 
insufficiently “actual or imminent” to provide for standing.   
  In delivering the Court’s opinion, Justice Scalia provided a good deal of argument and 
justification in support of his understanding of the injury in fact doctrine and the history of 
standing in general.  Acknowledging that the Constitution does not define the terms “judicial 
Power,” “Cases,” and “Controversies,”
89 Scalia nonetheless argued, by way of the Federalist 
Papers, that the judicial power is constitutionally bounded by “landmarks still less uncertain”
90 
than those that confine the powers of the legislative and executive branches.  He then spelled out 
the three-part test for standing cited earlier, requiring injury in fact (which in turn must be 
concrete and particularized, and actual and imminent (not conjectural or hypothetical)), 
causation, and redressability.
91  He cited several cases for each of these propositions, most 
prominently Warth v. Seldin and and several other cases from the 1980s that followed its general 
lead in requiring more and more specific factual injuries or threats thereof.  Among these was 
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28 City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,
92 where the Court had held that a man who had been held in an 
illegal chokehold by a police officer in the past did not have standing to sue to enjoin the use of 
the chokehold because, despite having been concretely injured by it already, he could not 
“establish a real and immediate threat that he would again be stopped for a traffic violation, or 
for any other offense, by an officer or officers who would illegally choke him into 
unconsciousness without any provocation or resistance on his part.”
93 
  In applying his test to the plaintiffs, Scalia made several moves that served to make the 
standing inquiry even more challenging for plaintiffs than it had already become.  One was to 
make explicit what had been hinted at in prior cases,
94 namely that “when the plaintiff is not 
himself the object of the government action or inaction he challenges, standing is not precluded, 
but it is ordinarily ‘substantially more difficult’ to establish.”
95  This more or less creates a 
presumption against standing for regulatory and statutory beneficiaries by assuming that they 
will be unlikely to be able to show the appropriate degree of traceable injury.  Scalia also made a 
much more significant and problematic argument in Defenders of Wildlife, which was to reject 
the concept of procedural injury as a valid source of standing. 
  Scalia rejected the approach of the Court of Appeals in Defenders of Wildlife, which had 
been to grant plaintiffs standing based on the idea that the government’s failure to follow the 
procedural requirements of the Endangered Species Act itself constituted an injury in fact.  As 
Scalia put it, “the court held that the injury-in-fact requirement had been satisfied by 
congressional conferral upon all persons of an abstract, self-contained, noninstrumental ‘right’ to 
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 have the Executive observe the procedures required by law.  We reject this view.”
96  Scalia 
hastened to explain that he did not intend to say that no citizen could enforce her procedural 
rights under a given statute; instead, the ability to enforce those rights required that a plaintiff 
have a concrete interest at stake that the rights were supposedly protecting.
97  He offered as 
examples that dedicated whale watchers could exercise their procedural rights in Court when 
their ability to see whales was threatened by whale harvesting,
98 or that a citizen could sue to 
enforce procedural requirements under the National Environmental Policy Act when a federal 
facility was being constructed next door to them.
99  Scalia’s basic point was that Congress could 
not eliminate the injury-in-fact requirement with citizen suit provisions.
100   
  Scalia defended his view with several arguments, calling on both constitutional principles 
and case law for support.  Constitutionally he relied on the doctrine of separation of powers, as 
the Court did in its early standing cases.  However, Scalia’s reasoning was slightly different from 
that employed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Those cases expressed 
reluctance to adjudicate abstract claims because the resolution of general policy issues was 
considered the domain of the political branches; Scalia’s concern was more specific.  He first 
reiterated the more general separation of powers concern that motivated the earlier cases, saying 
that “[v]indicating the public interest (including the public interest in Government observance of 
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30 the Constitution and laws) is the function of Congress and the Chief Executive.”
101  However, he 
then went on to state that “[t]o permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in 
executive officers’ compliance with the law into an ‘individual right’ vindicable in the courts is 
to permit Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief Executive’s most 
important constitutional duty, to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,’ Art. II, § 3.”
102  
Scalia’s major concern, then, seems to be that the citizen suit provision without an injury in fact 
requirement will allow the courts to overpower the executive in the scheme of checks and 
balances by refusing to allow the executive the appropriate discretion to not enforce the laws. 
  In terms of case law, Scalia drew particularly on the line of jurisprudence used in 
Frothingham v. Mellon, in which the Court characterized “generalized grievances” as 
nonjusticiable.  As seen above, the reasoning underlying that determination at the time was 
largely prudential, rather than constitutional, concerned as it was with the large numbers of 
claimants who would supposedly overwhelm the courts.
103  Scalia’s use of this strand of case 
law to support his constitutional argument is therefore unconvincing.  He also drew on more 
recent cases, however, to support his proposition.  These included Schlesinger v. Reservists 
Committee to Stop the War
104 and Allen v. Wright.
105  Both reiterated the point that “the 
generalized interest of all citizens in constitutional governance...is an abstract injury,” and 
therefore cannot serve as a basis for standing.
106   
                                                
  Both of these cases, however, as well as others that Scalia cited, had to do with citizens 
 
101 Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 576. 
102 Id.  
103 See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text. 
104 418 U.S. 208 (1974). 
105 468 U.S. 737 (1984). 
106 Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 217.  The Court made a similar point in O’Shea v. Littleton, 418 U.S. 488, 494 
(1974)(“Abstract injury is not enough.”). 
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 challenging the constitutionality of government action, not a lack of compliance with statutory 
regimes.  Scalia acknowledged this distinction in his opinion, but brushed it off as 
inconsequential:  
To be sure, our generalized-grievance cases have typically involved Government 
violation of procedures assertedly ordained by the Constitution rather than the 
Congress. But there is absolutely no basis for making the Article III inquiry turn 
on the source of the asserted right. Whether the courts were to act on their own, or 
at the invitation of Congress, in ignoring the concrete injury requirement 
described in our cases, they would be discarding a principle fundamental to the 
separate and distinct constitutional role of the Third Branch-one of the essential 
elements that identifies those “Cases” and “Controversies” that are the business of 
the courts rather than of the political branches.
107 
 
The assertion that the Article III inquiry should not turn on the source of the right at issue is itself   
problematic from a separation of powers perspective, and therefore undercuts the rationale that 
supposedly underlies the injury in fact requirement in the first place.  It suggests that Congress 
should not have the power to utilize a private attorneys general model when it deems that model 
to be necessary and proper.  This argument, as well as Scalia’s constitutional justification for 
injury in fact generally, will be addressed in more detail in Part II.
108 
  Scalia also drew a plurality of the Court to his argument that the plaintiffs’ injuries were 
insufficiently redressable.  He argued that the agencies responsible for funding the overseas 
projects would not necessarily be bound by any judgment the Secretary of the Interior might 
make upon consultation, and therefore requiring the consultation to occur might not remedy the 
injury.
109  Further, even were the agencies to be bound by a judgment, the small percentage of 
funding they provided to the projects meant that any Court remedy would not necessarily do 
                                                 
107 Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 576. 
108 See infra notes 135-62 and accompanying text. 
109 Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 569. 
32 anything to prevent the projects from moving forward and injuring the plaintiffs.
110 
  Justice Kennedy wrote a concurrence in Defenders of Wildlife expressing his own views on 
the intersection of standing and Congressional creation of causes of action.  He stated that 
“Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to 
a case or controversy where none existed before, and I do not read the Court's opinion to suggest 
a contrary view.”
111  He thought Congress had not done this with the Endangered Species Act, 
because its citizen suit provision did not establish outright that violations of the law per force 
injured the “any person” that the provision entitled to bring suit.
112  He then said that the Article 
III case and controversy requirement constituted the “outer limit” to Congress’ power to confer 
rights of action, and that this requirement prevented Congress from establishing “citizen suits to 
vindicate the public’s nonconcrete interest in the proper administration of the laws” because “the 
party bringing suit must show that the action injures him in a concrete and personal way.”
113 
 
D. The War Over Standing 
 
  The Court’s position on standing has varied in the time between Defenders of Wildlife and 
its most recent decision in Summers, and the cases reflect a sharp division between those Justices 
who would expand standing and those who would narrow it.  Critically, the Court’s decisions 
since Defenders of Wildlife, whether ruling for or against environmental plaintiffs, have all 
worked within the general rubric of injury in fact, specifically the three-part test that Scalia laid 
out in his opinion for the majority in that case.  This has meant that even when the liberal bloc on 
                                                 
110 Id. at 571. 
111 Id. at 580 (Kennedy, J. concurring). 
112 Id.  
113 Id. at 580-581. 
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 the Court has managed to build a coalition to liberalize standing requirements, victory has come 
at the price of giving further precedential weight to the injury in fact test.  The consequences of 
this loyalty to the Scalian approach can be seen in Summers, and will be explored in more detail 
in Part III. 
  The Court’s next major environmental standing decision after Defenders of Wildlife came 
in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment
114 in 1998.  In that case, plaintiffs lived near a 
steel plant and sued for that plant’s past violations of the Emergency Planning and Community 
Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA).
115  The injury claimed was a purely informational one; it was 
uncontested that the defendant had not met its reporting requirements under the statute, and 
plaintiffs argued that the deprivation of that information was itself an injury in fact.  Justice 
Scalia, writing for the majority, said that it was unclear whether an informational injury would be 
adequate to meet the injury in fact standard.
116  He went on to state that the Court would not 
address the question, however, because the plaintiffs failed to establish redressability and 
therefore clearly failed the standing test on that ground.  The plaintiffs had requested a number of 
different remedies from the Court, all of which Scalia found would not redress their injury 
because of its basis in past actions.
117  In the course of his analysis, he explained that  
although a suitor may derive great comfort and joy from the fact that the United 
States Treasury is not cheated, that a wrongdoer gets his just deserts, or that the 
Nation’s laws are faithfully enforced, that psychic satisfaction is not an acceptable 
Article III remedy because it does not redress a cognizable Article III injury.
118   
 
                                                 
114 523 U.S. 83 (1998). 
115 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1986). 
116 This question would later be decided in plaintiffs’ favor in Federal Election Commission v. Akins, 524 
U.S. 11 (1998), over the dissent of Justices Scalia, Thomas and O’Connor. 
117 Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 102-10 (finding that each of five proposed remedies did not redress the injury; in 
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continuing violation or the likelihood of a future violation, injunctive relief will not redress its injury”). 
118 Id. at 107. 
34 While overtly a point about redressability, this is a backhanded commentary on the injury 
requirement itself.  It reiterates what Scalia implied in Defenders of Wildlife in his rejection of 
procedural injury
119-- the presumed injury that would be remedied by “psychic satisfaction” is 
psychic dissatisfaction, and if psychic satisfaction is not a remedy for a cognizable Article III 
injury, then  “psychic [dis]satisfaction” cannot constitute a valid injury in fact.  While Steel Co. 
more generally stood for the proposition that it would be very difficult to establish standing to 
sue for wholly past infractions,
120 this point about psychic injury is particularly interesting 
because of its relevance to the Court’s next major decision. 
  In 2000, the Court decided Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), 
Inc.
121  This was a case brought under the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act, wherein 
plaintiffs complained of repeated NPDES permit violations by defendant Laidlaw.  Friends of the 
Earth offered member affidavits from individuals who lived near the facility and were concerned 
about the potential effects of Laidlaw’s pollution on their river activities, such as swimming, 
fishing and camping.  While they had no proof that the river or surrounding environment had 
actually been damaged, their concern led them to curtail these activities.  Justice Ginsburg wrote 
for the majority that “[t]he relevant showing for purposes of Article III standing...is not injury to 
the environment but injury to the plaintiff.”
122  In the circumstances of this case, the 
consequences of this statement were that the plaintiffs had a valid injury in fact by virtue of their 
discontinuation of outdoor activities, even though that discontinuation was based purely on their 
concern for the river’s cleanliness, rather than on any actual environmental damage (which was 
                                                 
119 See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 572-78. 
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121 528 U.S. 167 (2000). 
122 Id. at 181. 
35 
 minimal).
123  While this holding did not go so far as to overrule Justice Scalia’s holding in Steel 
Co. about “psychic injury,” since the injury itself is still the inability to engage in activity, the 
idea that injury could be based purely on concern rather than actual environmental damage was a 
significant liberalization of standing law.  The Court also found that the plaintiffs had standing to 
seek civil penalties as a remedy, despite Steel Co., given the ongoing nature of the violations and 
the potential deterrent value of penalties.
124  Justice Scalia (joined by Justice Thomas) dissented 
from both holdings, as well as a third about mootness.  He objected to the Court’s finding of 
injury in fact without any actual injury to the environment, and thought the plaintiffs failed on 
redressability because they sought only civil penalties, which would not necessarily deter further 
violations.  This last point raised serious constitutional concerns for Scalia regarding the capacity 
for courts and private litigants to invade the constitutional realm of the Executive branch.
125  
Justice Kennedy wrote a short concurrence also expressing some hesitation about those 
constitutional concerns, but stating that this was not the correct case in which to address them 
given that the questions presented did not present the issues squarely.
126   
  The trend of liberalizing standing continued with the Court’s next major standing decision, 
Massachusetts v. EPA.
127  This case was somewhat unique among the Court’s standing decisions 
because of its intense political salience; it concerned the question of EPA’s statutory authority to 
regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act, and dealt directly with the harms resultant 
from global warming.  With regard to standing, the question was whether the state of   
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124 Id. at 186-87. 
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126 Id. at 197 (Kennedy, J. concurring). 
127 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
36 Massachusetts could establish injury in fact, causation, and redressability based on the loss of 
coastal land caused by global warming and concomitant rising sea levels.  A five-Justice 
majority found that Massachusetts had standing, based on two different theories.  First, relying 
on a 1907 case called State of Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,
128 Justice Stevens wrote for the 
majority that states, because of their status as “quasi-sovereign” entities, deserved “special 
solicitude” in the context of standing analysis.
129  He then proceeded to engage in the usual three 
part test for standing.  The injury in fact, argued the majority, was the loss of coastal land that 
Massachusetts would suffer as a result of global warming.  Because sea levels had already risen 
ten to twenty centimeters at the time of the lawsuit, the harm qualified as imminent.
130  Further, 
the Court said, the fact that “these climate-change risks are ‘widely shared’ does not minimize 
Massachusetts’ interest in the outcome of this litigation.”
131  As to causation, the Court stated 
that while EPA’s failure to regulate greenhouse gases was not the sole cause of global warming, 
it was nevertheless a significant factor contributing to Massachusetts’ injury and therefore 
satisfied the causation requirement.
132  The Court used similar reasoning for redressability, 
arguing that while EPA’s regulation of greenhouse gases would not fully remedy global 
warming, it would “slow or reduce” the process.
133 
  Chief Justice Roberts wrote a dissent on standing, which was joined by Justices Scalia, 
Thomas, and Alito (Justice Scalia wrote a separate dissent on the merits for the same four 
Justices).  Roberts rejected Stevens’ reading of Tennessee Copper, arguing that the case dealt 
solely with remedies rather than standing, and therefore rejecting outright the concept that states 
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 should have any special solicitude in standing analysis.
134  He then confronted the Court’s 
findings on each of the three elements of standing.  He argued that the injuries associated with 
global warming were by the nature of the phenomenon insufficiently particularized and 
imminent.
135  Causation was also problematic, argued the dissent, because the complexities and 
global nature of climate change precluded EPA from being considered the cause of coastal land 
loss.
136  Further, for these same reasons, EPA regulating greenhouse gases would not remedy 
that injury, because global warming would continue (due to the unpredictable acts of third 
parties) despite being potentially abated by a court order.
137   
                                                
  The majority opinion in MA v. EPA gave heart to environmental plaintiffs by seeming to 
seriously relax the causation and redressability requirements, or as Chief Justice Roberts put it in 
dissent, allowing plaintiffs to “sue over any little bit.”
138  The opinion also treated the injury in 
fact requirement somewhat more leniently than the Court had in the past, especially in terms of 
imminence and particularization.  Between Laidlaw and MA v. EPA, the Court seemed to be 
establishing a trend towards liberalizing standing.  It is worth highlighting, however, that despite 
the liberal justices’ victories in these two cases, they maintained the basic framework of “injury 
in fact.”  As will be argued in more detail later on, this concession to the conservative view of 
standing law is a fatal flaw in any effort to truly change that law for the benefit of environmental 
plaintiffs and the environment itself.  It also allows the Court more latitude to revert to 
conservative standing principles, which is in fact what happened in Summers (discussed in Part 
III). 
 
134 Id. at 537. 
135 Id. at 540-43. 
136 Id. at 543-45. 
137 Id. at 545-46. 
138 Id. at 547. 
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Part II: Normative Arguments 
 
  I have attempted to show in Part I that the origins of the injury in fact test are obscure at 
best, and justified only marginally, if at all, by reasoned constitutional argument.  Later 
proponents of the test have offered constitutional justifications for it, briefly sketched in Part I, 
which I will address in more detail and rebut in this Part before turning to the Court’s most 
recent standing decision in Summers. 
  It is important to establish at the outset of any constitutional discussion that standing itself 
is not fundamentally contestable as a constitutional concept. The basic separation of powers ideal 
that runs throughout the Constitution precludes the Court from serving as a general policy maker.  
Plaintiffs should clearly not be able to petition courts for new environmental protection policy.  
Further, it is incontestable that, in order for the case and controversy requirement to do any work, 
courts’ jurisdictions must be limited such that they do not tread on the ground of the political 
branches.  However, when the legislature has established policy in statutes, and especially when 
those statutes contain citizen suit provisions, citizens should be able to vindicate their rights 
under those statutes in court.  The requirement that they demonstrate injury in fact, at least as the 
Court understands it, is not constitutionally defensible.   
  Proponents of the injury in fact doctrine offer several major constitutional justifications, 
two of which Scalia spelled out in Defenders of Wildlife.  He argued first that allowing courts to 
adjudicate claims when plaintiffs did not suffer an injury in fact amounted to allowing courts to 
vindicate the public interest, which he said was the exclusive function of the political branches.  
Scalia’s particular concern, however, was with the public interest in the government’s 
39 
 observation of laws and constitutional constraints.  He objected to courts taking jurisdiction over 
such complaints because, according to his view, they co-opt the executive function of enforcing 
the law in doing so.
139 
  Simply because the plaintiff is not injured in any concrete, tangible manner does not mean 
that vindicating her rights under a relevant statute will cause the court to tread on the 
constitutional territory of another branch of government.  The requirement that the plaintiff have 
a concrete interest at stake, rather than an abstract interest in environmental preservation or in the 
government following the law, is not inherent in Article III.  Rather, it is a vestige of the private 
law model in which the injury in fact model’s origins lie.
140  From a perspective unbiased by that 
historical trend, there is nothing innately unconstitutional about a court rendering judgment 
based on abstract harm.  
  The easiest case for which to argue this point is that wherein Congress has explicitly 
provided for citizen suits in a piece of legislation.  Almost every major environmental statute has 
a citizen suit provision that allows citizens to bring suit against violators or the administering 
agency.
141  For these laws, Congress has made the legislative judgment that the agency alone has 
insufficient resources to ensure proper enforcement of the law, and has enlisted the public to 
serve as private attorneys general.
142  Under these circumstances, there is little reason to worry 
about separation of powers in the context of courts serving as policy-making institutions-- the 
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Standards of Justiciability for Environmental Citizen Suits, 26 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 77, 77 n.3 
(2001) (collecting statutes). 
142 The concept behind this term can be traced to FCC v. Sanders Brothers, supra note 43.  The term itself 
originated with the case of Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943), and was most 
famously employed in Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153. 
40 policy underlying the suit has already been properly and democratically instituted by the political 
branches; the court is serving only to uphold and enforce the law as written.
143  However, this 
point serves to highlight Justice Scalia’s alternative separation of powers grievance regarding lax 
standing requirements-- namely that without an injury in fact requirement, the courts serve not 
just as policy-makers, but as enforcers of the law, and thereby tread unconstitutionally on the 
traditional and constitutional function of the executive branch.
144 
  This objection, while facially compelling, is a shallow one.  It assumes that the 
Constitution’s grant of powers to each branch of government is exclusive.
145  While it may have 
been realistic to interpret the Constitution this way at one point, the rise of the administrative 
state has rendered such a reading obsolete.  Administrative agencies, technically a part of the 
executive branch, exercise both legislative and judicial powers, in addition to executive ones.  
While this fact has been the subject of constitutional controversies, these have almost entirely 
been resolved in favor of agency authority.
146  This establishes that branches of government 
exercising powers supposedly designated to other branches is not in and of itself constitutionally 
problematic.  Courts can therefore serve as enforcers of the law without offending Article II, and 
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separation of powers is by no means absolute in the modern administrative state. 
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 indeed they have.
147 
  Justice Scalia’s more specific concern, however, seems to be with executive discretion-- 
namely that it is not within courts’ purview to take on an enforcement function because it will 
interfere with the executive branch’s inherent discretion to only enforce certain laws in certain 
cases.  Scalia’s first major writing on standing came in a 1983 article in the Suffolk Law Review, 
in which he elucidated an argument about standing and separation of powers that is strongly 
reflected later on in his Supreme Court opinions.  In that article, he made reference to a famous 
passage by Judge Skelly Wright wherein Wright envisioned a hand for courts in the enforcement 
process: “Our duty, in short, is to see that important legislative purposes, heralded in the halls of 
Congress, are not lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy.”
148  Scalia 
acknowledged this as an indication of the role courts had come to play in “assur[ing] the 
regularity of executive action,”
149 but rejected that role from a normative standpoint.  He said in 
response:  
Does what I have said mean that, so long as no minority interests are affected, 
‘important legislative purposes, heralded in the halls of Congress, [can be] lost or 
misdirected in the vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy?’  Of course it does -- 
and a good thing, too. Where no particular harm to particular individuals or 
minorities is in question, lots of once-heralded programs ought to get lost or 
misdirected, in vast hallways or elsewhere.
150 
 
Scalia’s argument here is in part a substantive critique of environmental laws; he offers no 
procedural or institutional explanation for why a lack of harm to minorities and individuals 
should mean that laws should be “lost or misdirected,” so we are left to assume that his 
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42 complaint about such laws is their content, the loss or misdirection of which would be “a good 
thing, too.”  However, he offers minimal constitutional explanation for why the executive branch 
should have such broad discretion to ignore democratically enacted laws.
151   
  From a separation of powers perspective, it makes little sense that the Executive branch 
should have that sort of discretion.  It makes intuitive sense for the legislature to have complete 
discretion over whether to enact laws; that same intuition does not hold for the executive branch 
and enforcing those laws once enacted.  The Executive’s constitutional role, and duty, is to 
enforce democratically enacted programs.
152  Justice Scalia believes that the electoral process 
will provide sufficient remedy for executive recalcitrance in this duty.
153  However, this is not 
the usual approach to constitutional impropriety-- when the President or Congress takes 
unconstitutional action, it is not generally assumed that the public will take care of the problem 
through the electoral process; the Court strikes the action down.
154  Scalia offers no explanation 
for why inaction should be treated any differently than action for constitutional review purposes, 
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 especially when that inaction (failure to enforce) can have the very significant impact of 
rendering Congress impotent.
155   
  Scalia’s main justification for why courts should not be in the business of enforcement 
generally, without a concrete injury at stake, is that courts exist fundamentally for the purpose of 
protecting minorities rather than majorities, and “there is no reason to believe they will be any 
good at [the latter].”
156  While it is true that courts’ fundamental purpose is antimajoritarian in 
some sense, insofar as they have the capacity and duty to protect individuals against majority 
infringements on their rights, this fact does not actually make for a strong argument in favor of 
Scalia’s approach.  The basic point of his argument is that courts do not have the policy 
sophistication of the elected branches and cannot effectively determine in the abstract when 
certain laws should be enforced based on the interests of the majority (and therefore should act to 
enforce them only when the rights of injured individuals are at stake).
157  But policy 
sophistication is irrelevant in light of what courts actually do when faced with suits by statutory 
beneficiaries alleging statutory violations.  From a practical standpoint, the actions of the court in 
the case of a suit seeking enforcement of an environmental statute will be the same whether the 
regulatory beneficiary has a concrete injury at stake or not.  Regardless of whether it is Joe the 
Hiker or Bob the Concerned Citizen or the Sierra Club who requests an injunction requiring the 
Forest Service to follow the appropriate procedures under the ARA, the court’s reasoning on the 
merits will be the same.
158  It will determine what the law requires and whether the agency’s 
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44 interpretation of that law was reasonable or not.
159   
  Given that a court’s reasoning on the merits will be the same regardless of whether the 
plaintiff has an injury at stake or not, it is unreasonable to use this factor to allow some 
beneficiaries into court but not others.  Indeed, Scalia’s antimajoritarian argument would make 
more sense if he were committed to limiting standing only to regulated parties.  In that case the 
courts truly would be serving only as countermajoritarian defenders of minority rights, rather 
than protecting minorities and some members of the majority (when a concrete interest of theirs 
happens to be at stake).   However, beneficiary standing has been well entrenched in case law 
since Sanders Brothers in 1940.
160  More importantly, it has also been codified in the 
Administrative Procedure Act.
161   
  Even were this not the case, there is something perverse about understanding the massive 
and powerful corporate entities regulated under environmental statutes as “minorities” in need of 
protection by the courts.
162  While these entities may be smaller in number than the majority who 
voted in favor of environmental protection, their influence in the regulatory and enforcement 
processes is disproportionately large, due to the financial resources at their disposal and their 
powerful lobbying capacity.  In light of this fact it does not seem rational to fear for the interests 
of the numerical minority being subject to tyrannical oppression.  Congress presumably sought to 
enlist citizens into the enforcement process via citizen suit provisions precisely because they 
feared inadequate enforcement in the face of agency capture and other disproportionate 
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 “minority” influence.
163  
  This brings us back to the basic question of the citizen suit provision and what role 
Congress should play in getting plaintiffs into court.  I have argued broadly that the injury in fact 
requirement is unjustified from a separation of powers perspective and that the parade of 
separation-of-powers-horribles
164 that would result without such a requirement is overstated.  
My underlying point is that an environmental statute on point with a citizen suit provision should
be enough to get any interested plaintiff into court, regardless of whether or not that plaintiff has
a concrete interest at stake.  This includes statutes that confer only procedural rights, such as the
National Environmental Policy Act.  As noted above in Part I, in his opinion for the majority in 
Defenders of Wildlife, Justice Scalia rejected the idea that Congress can override the basic 
standing requirements by legislation conferring procedural rights.
 
 
 
                                                
165   He does not believe that 
“procedural injury” should be a cognizable injury because he does not believe that the general 
public interest in having the government act in accordance with law is insufficiently concrete and 
particularized for standing purposes.
166   
  As noted above, however, all of the case law cited in Defenders of Wildlife in support of 
Scalia’s view on procedural injury had to do with citizens challenging government action that 
 
163 See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 219. 
164 The other type of horrible often cited, as noted earlier, is prudential-- namely that without an injury in 
fact requirement, citizens would bring frivolous suits that would be insufficiently adverse (as the majority 
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too, are overstated.  While the environmental groups may be motivated by ideology rather than concrete 
injuries, this does not have negative implications for their capacity to properly argue their case.  See 
Hessick, supra note 12, at 300 (“A litigant investing in such a suit is driven by principle, and the desire to 
vindicate that principle is likely to provide adequate motivation to litigate effectively.”). Further, the 
groups’ finite resources will insure against frivolity in their litigation decisions. 
165 See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text. 
166 Justice Kennedy expressed a similar view in his concurrence. 
46 was allegedly unconstitutional, not allegedly in violation of a statutory provision.
167  While he 
argued that “there is absolutely no basis for making the Article III inquiry turn on the source of 
the asserted right,”
168 in truth the source of the right should not be insignificant. This is because, 
unlike statutes with citizen suit provisions, the Constitution does not provide for citizen 
enforcement of its own provisions.  Instead, it relies for enforcement on the structural ideals of 
checks and balances and separation of powers, and more practically (at least after Marbury v. 
Madison), it relies on the Court to apply its strictures as against the other branches of 
government.  Environmental statutes, by contrast, have citizen enforcement built in.  The source 
of the asserted right should make a difference in terms of citizens’ ability to pursue that right in 
court, since one source of rights allows for citizen enforcement and the other does not.  The 
string of cases denying citizen standing to challenge the constitutionality of government action 
should therefore not bear on the question of citizen standing to challenge the legality of 
government action under a particular statute that allows for citizen enforcement.  While Justice 
Scalia argues that the citizen suit is unconstitutional insofar as it allows plaintiffs into court 
without a concrete injury (that is, based only on their interest in having the government act 
according to law), his arguments in favor of that constitutional understanding, as discussed 
above, are ill-founded. 
  When a statute does not have a citizen suit provision, the reasoning is less obvious but 
fundamentally no different.  In such cases, the legislature has not explicitly provided for citizen 
enforcement, so plaintiffs hoping to prevent environmental damage on the basis of that statute 
must bring suit under the APA.  Section 702 requires plaintiffs seeking review of agency action 
to be “adversely affected or aggrieved within the meaning of the relevant statute;” the question 
                                                 
167 See supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.  
168 Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 576. 
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 (from a normative perspective) is thus identical to that of any standing inquiry-- what harms to 
what interests should qualify as sufficient?  Justice Douglas in Data Processing interpreted §702 
to require injury in fact within the zone of interests contemplated by the statute, but as already 
discussed, this is normatively unjustified from a constitutional perspective.
169  Plaintiffs should 
have to show that they have interests at stake under the statute, but the types of harms that 
qualify for standing can be broader, constitutionally speaking, than those specific and concrete 
injuries that the Court has thus far espoused.   
 
Part III: Summers and a Necessary Shift 
 
  The Court’s most recent standing decision in Summers v. Earth Island Institute,
170 decided 
this March, can serve as a useful lens through which to view competing arguments about 
constitutional standing requirements, and ground them by viewing their factual consequences.    
The case had a lower profile than Massachusetts v. EPA, by virtue of dealing with the relatively 
mundane issue of timber sales rather than the politically charged issue of global warming.  This 
fact may have played into the Court’s conservative decision to limit standing in Summers; this 
possibility itself shows the necessity of a more dramatic shift in standing law than those 
undertaken in Laidlaw or MA v. EPA.  Those cases liberalized the standing test while 
maintaining the underlying framework of injury in fact, allowing the Court further leeway to use 
that test to once again narrow the availability of standing.  This outcome is unjustified by 
constitutional reasoning and goes against the ideals of environmental protection. 
 
                                                 
169 See supra notes 149-55 and accompanying text. 
170 No. 07-463, slip op. (U.S. Mar. 3, 2009). 
48 A. The Case 
    In Summers, Earth Island Institute and several other environmental groups sought to 
challenge a Forest Service regulation
171 that exempted salvage-timber sales on certain small 
parcels from notice and comment procedures under the Forest Service Decision-Making and 
Appeals Reform Act.
172  Suing under the general judicial review provision of the APA, the 
plaintiffs alleged this regulation to be “arbitrary, capricious, and not in accordance with law.”
173  
Specifically, they challenged the regulation as applied to a salvage-timber sale in the Sequoia 
National Forest called the Burnt Ridge Project.  An affidavit from a member of Earth Island 
Institute confirmed that he used the area frequently, had firm intentions and plans to do so again, 
and would be injured in his ability to view the local flora and fauna by the lack of opportunity to 
comment on the proposed sale.  Standing on this ground was uncontested, but the Burnt Ridge 
dispute was settled; this left only the facial challenge to the regulations at issue in front of the 
court.  The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, reversed the two lower courts and 
held that the plaintiffs did not have standing to pursue that facial challenge.  In so holding, Scalia 
wrote:  
We know of no precedent for the proposition that when a plaintiff has sued to 
challenge the lawfulness of certain action or threatened action but has settled that 
suit, he retains standing to challenge the basis for that action (here, the regulation 
in the abstract), apart from any concrete application that threatens imminent harm 
to his interests.  Such a holding would fly in the face of Article III’s injury-in-fact 
requirement.
174 
 
  The plaintiffs had tried to establish standing by various means, several of which relied on 
an affidavit from another member, Jim Bensman.  That affidavit asserted that Bensman had a 
                                                 
171 36 C.F.R. §§ 215.4(a), .12(f) (2003). 
172 16 U.S.C. §1612 note (1992).  
173 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. ___ (2009) (No. 07-
463). 
174 Summers, slip op. at 6. 
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 history of visiting National Forests in the past, and had been injured in the past by his inability to 
receive notice and comment on projects under the challenged regulation.  Justice Scalia and the 
majority rejected this argument, stating that past injury was not sufficient to establish 
standing.
175   
Earth Island also argued, however, that Bensman had a consistent and continuing interest
visiting National Forests, and that “the denial of ARA rights impairs those interests on a 
continuing basis….  Bensman's averments…demonstrate impairment of ‘concrete’ interests 
attributable to the Forest Service's procedures.”
 in 
 
 failure was critical in terms of being able to establish injury 
in fact,
rings 
 
y Government action affecting any 
ortion of those forests would be tantamount to eliminating the requirement of 
 
 the 
                                                
176  The majority did not accept this argument, 
holding that the respondents had failed to allege specific injuries to specific tracts.  The Court 
characterized this as “a failure to allege that any particular timber sale or other project claimed to 
be unlawfully subject to the regulations will impede a specific and concrete plan of Bensman’s to
enjoy the National Forests.”
177  This
 held the majority, because   
there may be a chance, but [it] is hardly a likelihood, that Bensman’s wande
will bring him to a parcel about to be affected by a project unlawfully subject to
the regulations . . . .  Accepting an intention to visit the National Forests as 
adequate to confer standing to challenge an
p
concrete, particularized injury in fact.
178   
The particularization requirement seems to have made a comeback here from its diminished 
status in MA v. EPA, where the generalized harm of coastal loss due to global warming was 
found sufficient to establish standing.  Scalia underscored this point for the majority with
 
175 Id. 
176 Brief for Respondents at 42, Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. ___ (2009) (No. 07-463). 
177 Summers, slip op. at 7. 
178 Id. at 7.  Earth Island had taken this fact to argue the opposite point, namely that naming tracts where 
plaintiffs would be injured in the future was “an obvious impossibility” and therefore the requirement was 
presumably unreasonable.  Brief for Respondents, supra note 170, at 45. 
50 statement that “generalized harm to the forest or the environment will not alone support 
standing.”
179  While Bensman did allege a specific desire to visit the Allegheny National Forest, 
Scalia reaffirmed the holding from Defenders of Wildlife that “some day intentions” will also not 
uffic
ck 
s sought 
ental 
tempt to 
 
nt is 
requested relief will prompt the injury-causing party to reconsider the decision that allegedly 
                                                
s e to establish injury in fact.
180   
  Lastly, the plaintiffs tried to establish standing via procedural injury, arguing that their la
of access to notice and comment was itself an injury.  They attempted primarily to distinguish 
their procedural injury from that rejected in Defenders of Wildlife:  “There, the plaintiff
not to enforce procedural rights afforded them, but internal procedures requiring intra-
governmental consultations; thus, they asserted only ‘an abstract, self-contained, noninstrum
“right” to have the Executive observe the procedures required by law.’”
181  In this case, by 
contrast, Earth Island argued (quoting the Defenders of Wildlife concurrence in a clear at
appeal to Justice Kennedy) that the procedural rights created by the ARA “are aimed at 
protecting the commenters’ concrete interests in the use and enjoyment of the national forests, 
and do not violate the principle that Congress may not ‘confer rights of action . . . in the absence
of any showing of concrete injury.’”
182  Earth Island also drew on language from MA v. EPA to 
argue in favor of procedural injury, citing the proposition from that case that “[w]hen a litiga
vested with a procedural right, that litigant has standing if there is some possibility that the 
 
179 Id. at 5.  The revival of the language of particularity is notable given that Scalia had been forced to 
tone down this element of his argument in Defenders of Wildlife.  See supra note 24.  See also Percival, 
supra note 24, at 11 (“In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, Justices Kennedy and Souter refused for   months 
to join Justice Scalia's initial draft opinion because it sought to convert the prudential notion that courts 
should decline to hear generalized grievances into a constitutional one that would bar environmental 
plaintiffs from seeking redress for widely shared injuries.”). 
180 Summers, slip op. at 8. 
181 Brief for Respondents, supra note 170, at 47 (quoting Defenders, 504 U.S. at 573). 
182 Id. (quoting Defenders, 504 U.S. at 580-81 (Kennedy, J. concurring)).  
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 harmed the litigant.”
183  Both arguments in favor of procedural injury were reasonable given the 
language of the statute at issue and the favorable treatment the Court gave procedural injury in 
MA v. EPA. 
  Just as he had in Defenders of Wildlife, however, Scalia rejected the procedural injury 
approach in the Summers majority opinion, stating that “deprivation of a procedural right without 
some concrete interest that is affected by the deprivation-- a procedural right in vacuo-- is 
insufficient to create Article III standing.”
184  In this statement he implicitly rejected Earth 
Island’s argument that its members’ interests in the National Forests could qualify as a concrete 
interest for purposes of procedural injury, but did not address that argument directly.  He further 
specified that it made “no difference that the procedural right has been accorded by Congress;” 
while such a procedural right could “loosen the strictures of the redressability prong,” it could 
not get plaintiffs around injury in fact, “the hard floor of Article III jurisdiction that cannot be 
removed by statute.”
185  While Scalia’s statement about redressability is somewhat of a 
concession from his position in Defenders of Wildlife (which had garnered only a plurality), the 
basic rejection of procedural standing is a powerful reminder of Congress’ limited ability to get 
environmental plaintiffs into court.   
  Justice Kennedy, in addition to joining the majority, wrote a somewhat obscure 
concurrence on this point, reiterating his position from Defenders of Wildlife that, while 
procedural injury alone would not suffice to create standing, Congress has the ability to “provide 
redress for a concrete injury” and thereby create cases and controversies “where none existed 
                                                 
183 Id. at 40 (quoting MA v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 518). 
184 Id. 
185 Id.  Here Justice Scalia prominently cited Justice Kennedy’s concurrence from Defenders of Wildlife 
stating that “the public’s nonconcrete interest in the proper administration of the laws” would not create 
standing.  Id.  
52 before.”
186  He thought that this case did not present that circumstance, however, since he did not 
view the ARA as an attempt by Congress to “identify or confer some interest separate and apart 
from a procedural right.”
187  Presumably this means that if Congress had granted the public a 
specific right to the preservation of the National Forests from salvage-timber sales, Justice 
Kennedy would find standing; however, this raises the question of why Congress should be able 
to create a substantive right that is enforceable in court, but not a procedural one.  It is also 
unclear why a procedural right should require a concrete interest at stake and a substantive right 
should not. 
  The dissent, authored by Justice Breyer and joined by Justices Ginsburg, Stevens and 
Souter, took issue with the majority’s treatment of organizational standing and the doctrinal 
consequences of City of Los Angeles v. Lyons.
188  The basic point of the dissent, adopting an 
argument by the plaintiffs in their brief, was that environmental organizations should be allowed 
to sue to enforce environmental laws when their membership has been injured in the past and is 
likely to be injured in the future.
189  Breyer argued that the upshot of Lyons was that when a 
plaintiff has been injured in the past, as in Lyons, she need only show a “realistic likelihood that 
the challenged future conduct will, in fact, recur and harm the plaintiff.”
190  Given the groups’ 
large memberships and the Forest Service’s concession that it would likely pursue hundreds of 
salvage-timber sales and other actions without notice and comment procedures, Breyer 
considered it realistically likely that the organization’s membership would suffer injury, and 
would have granted standing on that ground.  Scalia and the majority rejected this reasoning as 
                                                 
186 Id. at 1 (Kennedy, J. concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted) (repaginated). 
187 Id. 
188 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.  
189 See Brief for Respondents, supra note 170, at 43; Summers, slip op. at 5 (Breyer, J. dissenting) 
(repaginated). 
190 Id. at 5. 
53 
 “a hitherto unheard-of test for organizational standing.”
191 
 
B. Implications 
  The consequences of the outcome in Summers, where plaintiffs are not allowed standing 
based on procedural and abstract injuries, are unappealing from both constitutional and 
environmental perspectives.  The Appeals Reform Act requires that the Forest Service “establish 
procedures, including public hearings where appropriate, to give the Federal, State, and local 
governments and the public adequate notice and an opportunity to comment upon the 
formulation of standards, criteria, and guidelines applicable to Forest Service programs.”
192  The 
Forest Service regulation eliminating notice and comment procedures for sales of small tracts is 
very arguably in violation of this statutory mandate.  Society therefore has an interest in the 
regulation being investigated in court and potentially invalidated.  The only way to accomplish 
this is for a plaintiff to challenge the regulation in court in the first place.  Jim Bensman and 
other members of the plaintiff environmental groups, however, could not establish any imminent 
injury in fact to support standing for a facial challenge under the traditional test, since without a 
specific tract of land at issue, a concrete/factual injury would be impossible.  The regulation 
could therefore remain in place indefinitely.  Moreover, because the regulation cuts off notice 
and comment for these tracts, it limits potential plaintiffs’ ability to even realize when an illegal 
action is pending thereupon.  Thus the odds that any given plaintiff’s “wanderings will bring him 
to a parcel about to be affected by a project unlawfully subject to the regulations”
193 must be 
multiplied by the equally small odds that said plaintiff will even be aware that the project is 
                                                 
191 Id. at 9 (majority opinion). 
192 16 U.S.C. § 1612 note (1992). 
193 Summers, slip op. at 7. 
54 pending.  The resultant probability of a plaintiff achieving standing under the rule of this case is 
therefore very small, which means that the regulation will go unchallenged for a longer time, 
allowing hundreds of tracts to be unlawfully sold without public participation.
194  
   This result is not ideal-- neither in terms of the rule of law nor in terms of the fate of the 
trees and organisms involved.  The root cause of that result, namely the Court’s failure to find 
standing in Summers, is unnecessary and unjustified.  Several factors of this case render the 
constitutional arguments in favor of strict standing rules particularly inapt in context.  Those 
arguments rely on separation of powers concerns and a narrow conception of the judicial role as 
a protector of minority rights.  Recall that, in Justice Scalia’s formulation, the separation of 
powers concerns were twofold.  One concern was that without an injury in fact requirement, the 
courts would become policy makers.  The second was that without injury in fact, courts would be 
acting as general discretionary enforcers of laws, which treads on the constitutional ground of the 
executive branch.  As regards the first, the concern is unfounded in this case because the Appeals 
Reform Act clearly requires notice and comment proceedings to accompany Forest Service 
actions.  In agreeing to adjudicate Earth Island’s claim that the Forest Service’s regulation is 
counter to that statutory mandate, the Court would not be making policy but merely enforcing it.  
As regards the concern that courts enforcing laws without a concrete injury at stake would 
intrude upon the executive’s enforcement discretion, the argument just makes no sense in this 
context.  This case does not present the situation where the executive branch is choosing not to 
enforce the law against a particular individual; instead, the executive branch is itself violating the 
                                                 
194 Id. at 1 (Breyer, J. dissenting).  See also Ann E. Carlson, Standing for the Environment, 45 UCLA L. 
Rev. 931, 957 (1998) (“[I]n any facial challenge to a newly enacted rule, regulation, or statute, plaintiffs 
may have difficulty in demonstrating ‘imminent’ injury unless they can show a specific and harmful 
application of that rule, regulation, or statute. Thus environmental plaintiffs may have to wait to challenge 
new policies of general application until they have been implemented, with the possibility that real 
damage will already have occurred.”). 
55 
 law (via the Forest Service’s curtailment of notice and comment), and there is no constitutional 
reason why the executive should have the discretion to do so.  While electoral accountability 
could resolve the problem, instead of the courts, that would yield potentially as many as four 
years of irreparable damages to the environment.
195  There is no reason to believe that the 
Framers would have endorsed such a counterintuitive result.  Instead, separation of powers 
concerns seem to weigh in favor of allowing suit in this case, since continuing application of an 
executive branch regulation in violation of a congressional statute is counter to separation of 
powers principles.  The courts should be able to exercise their judicial power to rectify such an 
imbalance.   
  With regard to judicial role, Justice Scalia’s arguments about courts existing to protect only 
the rights of injured minorities are similarly inapposite in this case.  The plaintiffs are regulatory 
beneficiaries, and are therefore members of the majority regardless of whether they have an 
injury in fact or not.  The defendant here is an executive agency; the Forest Service, as a 
component of the government responsible for democratically enacting the law, is also part of the 
majority.  As such the entire framework of the counter-majoritarian argument does not apply to 
this case and others like it: there is no minority party whose rights are being infringed.  While 
one could argue that this is all the more reason for courts not to get involved, this argument 
would ignore the fact that this kind of suit, by regulatory beneficiaries against the government to 
compel enforcement, is commonplace, sensible, and most importantly enshrined in the 
                                                 
195 See supra note 147 and accompanying text.  It is also unrealistic to imagine that most voters would 
take into account the Forest Service’s track record at following the ARA in voting for president.  This 
factor renders the electoral accountability argument somewhat disingenuous; while proponents might 
argue that if voters don’t care about the enforcement of a law then it should be ignored (as Scalia in fact 
argued in his law review article, see supra note 146 and accompanying text), this argument is counter to 
the constitutional design and insufficiently values the rule of law as such. 
56 Administrative Procedure Act.
196   
  For another way to think about these broad arguments in context, consider the results of 
granting standing to Earth Island in this case.  Specifically, consider the consequences of finding 
standing without any sort of injury in fact-- that is, not based on the dissent’s conception of 
probabilistic injury in fact, but rather based purely on the group’s interest in environmental 
protection and their procedural injury claim under the ARA.  As argued in the abstract in the 
previous Part, the Court’s reasoning on the merits would be absolutely no different under these 
circumstances than it would be if Jim Bensman were able to name a particular tract subject to a 
particular project alleged to be unlawful.  The Court would ask whether Congress had spoken to 
the issue of notice and comment and, if not, whether the Forest Service’s interpretation of the 
statutory provision was reasonable.
197  The presence or absence of an injury in fact has no impact 
on this inquiry whatsoever.  
  It makes little sense for the threshold injury of standing to be so divorced from the merits 
of the case.
198  It forces environmental protection groups to go through the charade of 
establishing injury to some relatively inconsequential interest, like that of a small number of 
members in hiking or bird watching, in order to become eligible to fight for the interests of the 
resources themselves.  This result is conceptually indefensible, and persists only by virtue of the 
tradition requiring plaintiffs to show a concrete injury.  Granting standing to Earth Island and 
other groups based on their interest in environmental protection (and absent an injury in fact) 
would thus have the advantage of being intellectually honest about what enforcement lawsuits 
                                                 
196 See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1946). 
197 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. 
198 This phenomenon is a symptom of the fact that public standing law is a vestige of private and common 
law actions, where the plaintiff’s injury would by definition be the subject of the suit.  See generally 
Percival, supra note 24. 
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 are actually about.  The actual interests motivating lawsuits such as this one are not those of 
hikers to enjoy pristine wilderness, or of bird-watchers to catch a glimpse of a rare species.  
Instead, the Earth Island Institute, whose stated mission is “conserving, preserving, and restoring 
the ecosystems on which our civilization depends,”
199 presumably has the more high-minded 
goal of saving the actual resources at stake by forcing government and private actors to act in 
accordance with environmental law.   
  The point is clearer to see in cases where standing is granted and the parties are able to 
argue the merits. Take another case from this term as an example.  In Winter v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council,
200 an environmental group sued the Navy for failure to adequately 
meet its obligations under the National Environmental Policy Act
201 with regard to its use of 
active sonar in military exercises, which was alleged to be harmful to whales and other sea life 
off the coast of southern California.  To establish standing, the group filed affidavits from several 
of its members stating that they were avid whale watchers and that injury or death to the whales 
in that region would injure their ability to see whales.
202  This was sufficient injury for standing 
purposes, but demonstrates the extent to which the standing inquiry distorts the actual values at 
stake in litigation such as this.  Common sense suggests that it is unlikely that a major 
environmental organization would go to court just to protect the interests of a few people in 
seeing marine mammals; presumably, then, the interests of the whale watchers were not the 
primary focus of the litigation.  Rather, the actual interests at stake from the plaintiffs’ 
                                                 
199 Earth Island Institute (About Us), http://www.earthisland.org/index.php/aboutUs/ (last visited Apr. 7, 
2009). 
200 No. 07-1239, slip op. (U.S. Nov. 12, 2008). 
201 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970). 
202 See Brief for the Petitioners at 43, Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 555 U.S. ___ (2008) 
(No. 07-1239). 
58 perspective were those of the whales.
203  The standing inquiry in this case and others like it 
merely distorts the nature of the underlying claim.  
  It could be objected that liberalizing standing doctrine by eliminating the injury in fact 
requirement would flood the courts with groups like Earth Island Institute, who are motivated 
purely by ideology.
204  This concern is not particularly realistic, however, given that 
environmental groups, as well as individual plaintiffs, have limited resources.  This will prompt 
them to litigate strategically, as they already do.  Without an injury in fact requirement, however, 
they will target their efforts toward suits that will curb the most problematic violations of 
environmental law rather than toward suits where they could establish injury in fact.  Further, 
even if there were an increase in suits by ideologically motivated litigants, this would not be a 
normatively undesirable result.  It is critical to remember that all such suits, like Summers, allege 
violations of existing laws, and therefore ideological motivation is irrelevant-- suits will be 
limited by the provisions of democratically enacted laws like the ARA.  Society has an inherent 
interest in proper enforcement of its laws,
205 and thus allowing more plaintiffs to challenge 
                                                 
203  For another example of a similar distortion, see Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 154 
F.3d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1998), wherein plaintiff had to assert an “aesthetic” injury to his interest in seeing 
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S. Greve, The Private Enforcement of Environmental Law, 69 Tul. L. Rev. 339 (1990).  A narrow 
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requirement to allow ideological litigants would, by contrast, seem to better address Greve’s concern. 
205 See Steven L. Winter, What if Justice Scalia Took History and the Rule of Law Seriously?, 12 Duke 
Envtl. L. & Pol’y. F. 155, 161-163 (2001). 
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 statutory violations is by no means an inherently undesirable outcome.
206 
 
Conclusion 
 
 While  Summers does not drastically change the law of standing, it is notable that it did not 
cite MA v. EPA once, nor did it cite any part of Laidlaw that was not itself citing to Defenders of 
Wildlife.
207  This demonstrates that any incremental gain that advocates of liberal standing 
doctrine make at the Supreme Court level are not necessarily secure, at least to the extent that 
they retain the basic structure of the injury in fact test.  Especially in cases involving timber 
sales, wildlife and other mundane environmental issues without drastic human consequences at 
stake, the Justices are unlikely to perform the jurisprudential contortions that they used to find 
standing in MA v. EPA.
208   To address the problems with standing law that I have attempted to 
elucidate in this paper, a more drastic shift in standing law is necessary.  Such a shift, namely 
eliminating the injury in fact requirement, would serve both to protect natural resources and 
preserve the rule of law.  Common sense, not to mention legal and environmental ethics, demand 
that citizens have some redress when government or private entities violate environmental laws, 
even in cases where there is little at stake except the fundamental rights of trees or water to exist 
unmolested and the abstract public interest in having government follow and enforce its own 
laws.  The injury in fact requirement, no matter how attenuated, is incompatible with this end.  
                                                 
206 But see Jonathan H. Adler, Stand or Deliver: Citizen Suits, Standing, and Environmental Protection, 
12 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F. 39, 61-63 (2001) (arguing that optimal enforcement is less than full 
enforcement). 
207 The opinion cited to Laidlaw twice, both times for the basic standing test elucidated in Defenders of 
Wildlife. 
208 Laidlaw is admittedly a notable exception.  However, the result there can be explained by the make-up 
of the court, which was more amenable to liberal standing at the time, as well as the repeated and 
egregious violations of the law that were at issue in that particular case.   
60 To properly do justice, the Court must abandon the doctrine as a failed experiment that is ill 
suited to the public and environmental law contexts.  By doing so, the Court could better 
reconcile the requirements of standing with the realities and necessities of modern environmental 
law.   
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